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Indigenous Labour Arrangements and Household Security in Northern
Pakistan

Ken I. MacDonald
Department of Geography, University of Toronto

Introduction
How any community provides a material basis of
security for its members is a function of the allocation
of time and resources (i.e., labour) devoted to the
minimization of risk. In this paper, I argue that the
time and effort devoted to the minimization of risk is
not distinct from, and is indeed integral to, the
organization and practice of everyday life. Labour
arrangements exist as an important element of social
and economic organization and thus affect the
vulnerability or security of individual households. Yet
this relationship between labour arrangements and
household security, like many aspects of smallholder
household organization, has generally been ignored
within the study of natural hazards and vulnerability
(MacDonald 1994). In this paper, I refer to a variety of
labour arrangement strategies in the Karakoram
mountain village of Askole to illustrate how particular
labour arrangements, and the relations of authority that
sanction them, reduce the vulnerability and, de facto,
increase the security of household members. The
argument I present relies on certain premises drawn
from recent research in natural hazards which confronts
and reformulates traditional conceptions of risk and
hazard (Hewitt, 1983, Watts 1983, Douglas 1992).
These premises include:
a) that specific hazards in any environment are an
intrinsic part of that environment, and that societies
with a long history of habitation in those environments
have developed relationships which reduce the threat to
production and reproduction posed by environmental
fluctuations;
b) the mediation of environmental relations which
affect vulnerability of individuals and communities both
flow from, and modify, the conditions of everyday life;
c) the allocation of time and resources (i.e., the
effort or labour) devoted to the avoidance or
minimization of risk, and the ability to respond to
hazard flow from the routinized and repetitive strategic
conduct of individuals who typically reside within the
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social collective of a household and fall under the
governance of its institutions of authority; and
d) that as human-environment relations are largely
structured through the intentional and active
transformation of nature for survival, labour is
obviously a key element in the mediation of
environmental relations that minimize risk.

The Physical and Social Context of
Production in Askole
Askole (75°50° E 35°41° N), the uppermost
settlement in the Braldu valley of northern Pakistan, is
situated at an altitude of 3050 m on a large terrace fan
about 200m above the Braldu river (Fig. 1). With a
population of about 370, Askole has, until recently,
remained relatively isolated from much of the
modernization and planned development occurring
throughout the Karakoram range. The economy of the
village is primarily based on subsistence agropastoralism. Production occurs on terraced fields near
the valley floor and livestock follow vertical
transhumant cycles to high altitude pastures. Wage
labour, however, has become increasingly important in
the regional economy since partition from India.
Villagers acquire cash primarily through their service to
the adventure tourism industry. Due to its close
proximity to a number of the world's highest peaks and
longest glaciers, the area has become increasingly
popular with climbers and trekkers. Despite this, most
men are only sporadic participants in the adventure
tourism industry. All villagers have access to the land
and strategic resources they require for survival.
The physical situation of Askole is typical of many
Karakoram villages, but would definitely be considered
hazardous in conventional terms. The nucleated
settlement and household-controlled fields are contained
between a steep rock wall to the north and a river-cut
cliff to the south. The rock wall is prone to recurrent
mass movements and frequent landslides along the rivercut cliff pose a significant land-loss hazards to village
inhabitants. Askole is also located in a single cropping
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zone and has a regionally short growing season of
approximately 140 days. Livestock travel to high
altitude pastures in various stages between late July and
late October. Fieldwork, however, extends year round,
with the most intensive period between mid-April and
mid-October. The village, like many Karakoram
communities, is located in an arid zone with average
growing season precipitation of 30mm. Production,
then, is completely dependent on irrigation from high
altitude snow and ice melt. The short growing season
leads to a significant problem with late spring and early
autumnal frosts, as well as potential inequalities in the
seasonal distribution of water. Other recurring
damaging events include mass movements, wind
storms, crop diseases, and epidemics.
Cropped land is held privately within the household,
whereas grazing land is held as a village commons, with
equal access to all villagers. The household is the basic
productive and social unit in the village, yet all
households experience periods of growth and decline so
that, although large extended households are seen as the
ideal type, the actual distribution of household types in
the village ranges from single nuclear families to fourgeneration joint extended family households. This
waxing and waning of household status results in the
existence of households with a varied resource base (i.e.,
resource-rich and resource-poor households) and a
differential ability to cope with seasonal labour

bottlenecks and sudden labour demands. Outside of the
household, lineage allegiances are quite strong in the
village, and while there is a clan structure - villagers
belong to one of 5 clans - the nucleated order of
settlement in Askole supports strong social and
economic relationships on the basis of neighbourhood
rather than clan allegiances.

Risk Mediation and Rational Diversity
Concordant with its physical situation, Askole's
farming system effectively reduces risk and
accommodates most environmental problems either
through specifically targeting a hazard such as erosion,
or through social and ecological practices which spread
risk across the ecological and social surfaces of
production. The characteristic risk-reducing feature of
Askole's agro-ecology is a rational diversity in the
ecological, economic and social organization of
production.
In reviewing the means employed to mediate risk
and absorb and deal with hazards in Askole, I
distinguish between agro-ecological practices and social
practices. Few of these practices, however, are
particular to any specific damaging geophysical agent.
Rather, a rational diversity means that risk is mediated
and a broad range of hazards can be prepared for, through
specific ecological practices (e.g., intercropping or
spatially disp~rsed fields) (Table 1).

TABLE 1

Selected risk mediating agro-ecological practices in Askole

•CROP PRODUCTION

• Dispersed land holdings.
• Agro-pastoralism with mixed cropping.
• Heterogeneous cropping landscape.
• Intercropping.
• Polyvarietal planting of staple crop including an early variety.
• Delayed planting of short-duration secondary crop.
• Crop rotation.
• Erosion reduction
terracing of slope
division of fields into irrigation beds
planting of vegetation in gullies
construction of step terraces in gullies
field reclamation techniques.
• Co-ordinated experimentation with new innovations and planting material.
• LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION

• Species diversity.
• Vertical transhumant cycles.
• Spatial dispersal of pastures.
• Communal tenure of pastures.
• Flexible supervision of livestock at pasture.
• Co-ordinated movement of collective village herds and flocks.
• Herd size limited by ability to stall feed animals.
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I do not mean to promote an uncritical view of
Askole, its inhabitants, their farming system, or their
capacity for environmental management, but it is
apparent that Askolepong operate a farming system,
with strong risk-reducing elements, which is well
prepared to buffer periodic threats to a subsistence food
supply. These practices, however - a diversified and
risk-reducing adaptive agriculture - cannot exist apart
from, and indeed is structured through, the organization
of society.
While agro-ecological practices deal with the more
immediately apparent or dangerous hazards, the
responsibility for dealing with those less 'knowable'
risks or hazards is unloaded onto institutional processes
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). In this way, regardless
of the degree of certainty surrounding environmental
conditions, individual security is maintai-ned through
established social relationships and the expectation,
through subscription to a set of collective values, that
one's kin, friends and neighbours will be of assistance
in the event of a serious crisis which poses a threat to
subsistence or household reproduction (Douglas 1978,
Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).
In Ask ole, the household is the primary locus of
security which, depending on size, demographic

constitution, and political status, provides varying
degrees of security for its members. Within the extended
family households, individual security is enhanced
through co-operative sharing of productive tasks which
reduces the threat of subsistence crises for individuals
and constituent families. It is also the normative status
of the household which ties individuals into networks or
frameworks of social relationships which can provide
access to shelter and strategic resources in the event of a
crisis. In Askole, these relationships operate first as
networks of mutual aid which are unique to particular
households (e.g., established through ties of
consanguineal kinship, marriage, friendship or contract),
~nd second, as relations and moral obligations of
cooperation and assistance centred on the wider society
(e.g., reciprocal arrangements between lineage
households, neighbours, and normative expectations of
assistance at the village level, such as voluntary
workgroups). This social organization of the village
establishes and maintains certain social relationships
and practices which can help a household to retain
viability in the face of a broad spectrum of crisisinducing circumstances. In short, social organization in
Askole emphasizes social reproduction through the
continuance of the household as the locus of security for
individual villagers (Table 2). It is a survival vehicle
(Adams 1981).

TABLE 2

Selected risk mediating social practices in Askole
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Nucleated settlement form.
Multi-generational complex households.
Extended family households as locus of production, distribution and consumption.
Economic diversification within household.
Collective ownership of productive resources within the household.
Moral philosophy of self-help and self-reliance within household.
Absence of wife seclusion.
Lineage adoption and fosterage.
Collective labour arrangements
voluntary work groups
communal work groups
stock associateships
threshing partnerships.
Codified norm of household turn-taking in communal duties.
Strategic marriage alliances.
Obligations of mutual aid and norms of balanced and generalized reciprocity based on agnatic and affinal
kin relationships.
A ceremonial polity which binds social ties, redistributes wealth and affirms social commitments to the
village ethic.

Risk Reduction, the Household and Labour
Arrangements
For the most part, fieldwork and the labour it
demands are the responsibility of individual households.
However, given the seasonality of production in the
village and the dispersed spatial surface of production,
situations do exist where labour can be a constraining
factor in maintaining subsistence. To overcome these
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constraints, conventions of labour allocation within
society aid village households. These operate both in
support of routine activities and to overcome more
regular periodic labour shortages. Outside of the
physical context of the household, then, it is the
understood mutual obligations of kinship and coresidence in the village that mitigate the vulnerability of
households. These obligations are rooted in different
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social foundations but are manifested in various forms
of shared labour arrangements such as those outlined
below (Table 3).

Labour Arrangements in Support of Routine
Fieldwork
Under the rubric of social obligation, a range of
networks outside of the household may be relied upon
to provide labour for day-to-day activities and to provide
buffers against crisis. The most specific and reliable of
these, however, are commonly found amongst close
patrilineal kin such as the localized lineage.
Cross-household Lineage Partnerships are effective
during periods of peak labour demands when labour
from large lineage households is frequently pledged to
labour-poor lineage households. Individual households

may operate in co-operative clusters but these
arrangements do not 'free' household labour to any great
extent, and definitely not to a sufficient degree to permit
full participation in alternate economic opportunities
such as portering. But they do help to offset the
material effects of low producer/consumer ratios for
small families, and minimize the potential of shortage
when faced with a sudden demand for labour. Through
co-operation in daily tasks, a commitment to lineage
security and survival is constantly expressed. More
importantly, this continual expression of mutual
reliance reflects an absolute relationship in which the
combined resources of lineage households become the
last line of defense for any member-household facing an
impending or actual subsistence crisis.

TABLE 3

Risk-mediating Labour Arrangements in Askole village
• Labour Arrangements in Support of Routine Fieldwork
• Cross-household Lineage Partnerships
• Cross-household Extra-Lineage Partnerships
• Individual Extra-Kin Agreements or Contracts

• Labour Arrangements in Support of Periodic Tasks
• Co-operative Work Groups
• Affinal Kin Obligatory Labour
• Clan-based Obligatory Labour

Communal Labour Arrangements in Support of Seasonal Tasks and Contingent Needs
• Public Service Duties allocated through the metanorm of ress (turn-taking)
• Communal Work Groups

Cross-Household Extra -Lineage Partnerships
operate much like lineage partnerships and are effective
during times of peak labour or resource demands (eg.,
harvest and threshing). Formal cross-household
partnerships exist to provide resource or labour poor
households with access to the wider and more balanced
reserves of the village.
Individual Extra-Kin Agreements or Contracts.
Outside of kin based obligations, rights and duties,
villagers occasionally engage in individual agreements
or contracts (kha ngis byet; lit. the work of two
mouths). These arrangements can help to overcome
labour shortages or subsistence crises for households
that lack access to support from lineage mates. They
are also used to obtain support for non-traditional
activities. In Askole, norms of reciprocity apply only
to elements of the traditional household economy and do
not apply to market-oriented activities such as shopkeeping and craft production. Increasingly, these

contracts tend to resemble emergent patron-client
relationships within an expanding market economy.
These arrangements are far from mutually exclusive
in relation to any particular task and, at any given time
can all be found regulating the same task within
different households. For example, the labour required
to manage livestock while at pasture households may be
arranged through lineage partnerships, extra-lineage
agreements and contracts.
Labour Arrangements in Support of Periodic
Tasks
While the arrangements listed above certainly apply
to all contingencies, alternate forms of labour
arrangement can be called on periodically. These rely
on both village and extra-village relationships.

Co-operative Work Groups come together on an ad
hoc voluntary basis whenever they are required by a
household, usually to repair household lands and
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buildings. Assistance is given on the basis of
generalized reciprocity (and rarely if ever refused) and
permits some households to overcome limits placed on
their ability to respond to hazard by a lack of labour.
Such co-operative arrangements help to buffer the
potential marginality of smaller households with poor
access to alternate economic activities (indeed they
reduce the potential increase in vulnerability created
through household partition which implicitly reduces
household labour supply).

village is diffused among all village households over
time, ress is the process which symbolizes total
community involvement in the exercise of authority,
encourages civic responsibility and social integration,
and reciprocally binds the household to the village. It is
largely through the role of ress in allocating labour that
the welfare and social reproduction of the household is
inextricably bound to the welfare and social reproduction
of the village.

Affinal Kin Obligatory Labour. Aside from direct
agnatic ties and lineage obligations, established
relationships with affinal kin can be relied upon to help
buffer subsistence crises. These are maintained and
strengthened through periodic visits to the spouse's
natal household, and a continuing commitment to these
relationships· is partially expressed through the practice
of cross-cousin marriage. These affinal relationships
can be important in overcoming seasonal labour
bottlenecks or resource shortages.

Risk Reduction, Labour and Household
Authority

Clan-based Obligatory Labour Beyond relying on
the assistance of localized lineage members and affinal
kin in the case of need, households can expect to receive
a certain degree of assistance from fellow clan members.
In general, such help includes access to resources and
labour, but this aid forms a part of a balanced reciprocal
relationship. Notably, given Askole's nucleated spatial
structure, the reliability of clan-based reciprocity
diminishes with kin and spatial distance and a household
may find more help from unrelated neighbours than
from relatives living at the edge of the kin network.

Communal Labour Arrangements in Support
of Seasonal Tasks and the Contingent Needs
of the Village
Communal Work Groups are formed through
sanction both at stipulated times and as needed to
provide the labour required to maintain village
infrastructure. These continual efforts to maintain and
repair village resources can be seen as an 'everyday'
passive approach to risk management and the protection
of vulnerable land. But these co-operative groups are
also important in effecting a collective response to
hazard, as they permit a rapid response to environmental
fluctuations. These groups not only alleviate periodic
labour shortages, but also curtail the extent of loss in
the event of hazard and allow the village to repair
damage and return to a focus on production within a
relatively short time following a crisis, without
assistance from external agencies.
Public Service Duties allocated through the norm of
ress (turn-taking). The labour supply for a wide range
of communal tasks is governed by the norm of ress
(turn-taking) Within the political domain, this process
is a means of "abjuring tyrannical rule by the few over
the many", or of avoiding the control of one social
group by another (Parker 1991; 354). As the
responsibility for administration and security of the
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To this point, I have attempted to illustrate that a
risk-reducing capacity in Askole exists and has
historically emerged, in part, through the capable and
knowledgeable actions of the villagers - that is ,
through their management of labour. However, these
actions do not operate in a structural void. Ultimately,
the risk-reducing characteristics of specific ecological or
social practices are realized through the intelligent
allocation of time, tools, and resources. This
management is the responsibility of local institutions
of authority. It is these institutions that authorize and
allocate the necessary time, energy and resources, and
sanction the practices and social forms that create a 'risk
averse utility surface' (Watts 1983), and attempt to
avoid pre-conditioning the community to disaster.
There are two primary institutions of authority in
Askole which directly affect decision making and the
allocation of household labour and resources. These are
the household head (khang-go) and the village 'manager'
(yul ltumpa). A third institution of authority, the
village headman (trampa), figures prominently in
communal life and extra-village relations, but has little
direct control over the allocation of village labour or
resources. Notably, these are all what I call 'traditional'
institutions of authority meaning that they have not
been superimposed by the state, but rather have
historically derived legitimacy from within the
community.
Khang-go

Within the household, the khang-go, along with his
female equivalent the dakhmo, manages household
resources, authorizes work projects and allocates the
time, labour and materials needed to complete those
projects. He is the primary decision maker in the
household, and within the context of local knowledge,
the constraints of traditional customs and norms, (e.g.,
gender division of labour) and overarching authority
relations, he determines, on a seasonal basis, the
productive landscape of the household - a landscape that
I have described as risk minimizing. In both economic
production and social organization, the khang-go plays a
central role in perpetuating risk reduction and social
security.
Along with maintaining a constant risk-minimizing
surface of production, the khang-go also plays a role
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during hazardous events (e.g., frosts) by reallocating the
time, labour, tools, and resources among household
projects and mobilizing them to curtail the impending
or actual crisis. It is also the responsibility of the
khang- go to contribute household resources to
communal efforts to deal with hazards. Beyond this, the
khang-go, operating within certain well-defined cultural
criteria, shapes the economic diversity of households by
deciding which members can participate in the porter
trade, or engage in the production of crafts. He also has
ultimate, but accountable, authority over the
disbursements of the proceeds from these activities
which can be used to help avert or buffer the impact of a
subsistence crisis.
In summary, from the perspective of the household,
the khang-go defines institutional projects, and
structures those activities responsible for maintaining
the agro-ecological and social practices that reduce risk
and provide a degree of security. In doing so, he is
integral to minimizing the vulnerability of the
household and its members.
Yul ltumpa
The broader concerns of labour allocation in the
village are regulated by the village 'manager' (yul
ltumpa), an institution charged with regulating seasonal
life in the village. Yul ltumpong (pl.) are selected
annually, on the normative principle of ress, from a
rotational schedule of households. In Askole, four men
(usually household heads) serve as yul ltumpong for a
one year term. Responsibilities of yul ltumpong
include the pronouncement and enforcement of village
laws, the vigilant monitoring of field and pasture
conditions during the agricultural season to ensure
compliance with norms, and the remedy of infractions
before they result in damage or conflict. They are also
responsible for regulating access to community
resources such as irrigation water and pasture. In this
sense, then, yul ltumpong, are decision makers who
govern the pace of production for the village as a whole.
The authority of yul ltumpong over the definition
and realization of communal projects, and their ability
to impose sanctions to ensure the completion of those
projects, provide the capacity to respond effectively to
environmental events which threaten social reproduction
and community viability. In response to any hazard,
they have the ability to authorize new projects and
commandeer and allocate labour and resources to curtail
the damage. This capacity is also related to their
sanctioned control over the seasonal relations of
production, and the management of communal
resources. In carrying out these responsibilities, they
continually provide a degree of security by maintaining
risk reducing practices. In their exercise of authority,
then, yul ltumpong provide a measure of security
and either minimize or attempt to equalize vulnerability
among all village households.
Conclusion
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The main points that I want to make here are:
a) that both the mediation of risk and the potential
for disaster, in small, subsistence oriented communities
like Askole stem from the conditions of everyday life;
and
b) that the risk reduction, or the security system of
material life, that is practiced in everyday life,
specifically in those institutional projects aimed at
ensuring seasonal agricultural production and the social
reproduction of the household, are realized through
durable labour arrangements and reliant on the
implemented decisions of agents of authority.
I must add, however, that the ability to implement
decisions is dependent upon the continued legitimation
of these agents which is supported, in part, by their
expressions of commitment to a morally based set of
collective values held by all village residents. There
are, however, differing degrees of participation, with
young men demonstrating less interest than old.
Evidence of this emerging conflict is becoming
increasingly clear in Askole largely through the
activities of the adventure tourism industry which, by
prioritizing values of self-interest, and notions of
private goods as opposed to communal good and
collective ownership, has set up a trend toward civil
privatism which is in conflict with collective values.
Local development initiatives also threaten to disrupt
contextually rational practices and to confound the
authority of traditional institutions.
These threats to collective values and rational
practice are manifest, partially at least, as a challenge to
the legitimacy claims of 'traditional' institutions of
authority (evident, for example in a resistance to
authority and premature partitioning of households).
This in itself, is not necessarily harmful when it occurs
in isolated cases- i.e., the case of a 'bad' leader; but here
it is the legitimacy of the individual, not the
institution, that is being challenged. If we accept the
assertion that legitimacy underlies social stability, as
expressed in its ability to adapt to strains or changes
confronting it, when this challenge becomes consistent,
a legitimation crisis, to borrow from Habermas (1975),
erodes the ability of the social system to mediate risk or
uncertainty and increases the vulnerability of household
members to subsistence crises.
The ability to mediate risk through labour and
minimize the vulnerability of individuals is certainly a
function of the labour arrangements that exist in a given
context. But more importantly, these are reciprocally
bound to a set of collective values which maintains a
common interest in the good of the 'Other' and to the
ability of sanctioning institutions to maintain those
arrangements. The durability of risk-reducing labour
practices is challenged when the values and authority
which sanction them come under threat. This threat
seems to be reaching the village of Askole now. I
presume that it has already reached numerous other
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